In order to go in a different angle to that of usual posts that focus on specific topics or events around the club as they happen, I figured I’d go for a different angle this time. Given my experience in coaching, and my desire to test out a different sort of column, I thought it wise to write a tactics pieces. Obviously I hope you enjoy the piece, as the fans are the focus of this site and, if you do likeit, I might make it a semi-regular featured column.
As we all know, tactics comprise a significant part of the game, with formations coming and going over the years and decades of football all across the world. Nowadays, the majority of formations used by Premier League teams tend to fall into two broad categories – 4-4-2 and 4-3-3 variants. This is a far cry from the tactics utilised in the 1930’s, where formations such as 2-3-5 were not only seen, but readily used, and illustrates how tactics have changed with time.
Tactics – The Closest Thing To Chess In Football
Tactics are often the difference between success and failure, no matter the sport, as many games involving giant killing feats have illustrated. Sometimes the best option is not to play your own style, but to play the opponent. Some may say that adapting one’s ability and formation to the opponent signifies a subconscious capitulation that, by such a ploy, the team is somehow venerating their opponents as better by their “need to be stopped” as opposed to imposing one’s own game.
For Villa, the fact of the matter is that several teams are, player for player, simply better than our current squad. This isn’t meant as any form of sleight, and any sensible Villa fan will know, merely a statement of fact. As much as we may laud some of our charges, there will always be good players that we have to face, and many times they may just simply be faster, better, fitter, stronger, or whatever. In straight forward matches where the teams are roughly equivalent in stature, playing the same tactic with the same style on both sides will generally create 50/50 splits in wins and losses, including of course a rough number of draws.
Tactics obviously introduces a “rock, paper, scissors” aspect to games. In such a setup, it is possible to skew this 50/50 split of results based upon targetting systems dynamically. Let me give you an example on coping with 4-4-2.
Team A is playing 4-4-2 with no standard wingers. What might be a suitable formation for Team B?
Team B – Using Wingers
The first option available to team B is to simply play the same formation with a slight variation. In this instance, the addition of wingers may well suit team B if they can create width, as well as having strikers to take their chances. However, this can only work with effective supply, and with team A playing slightly more narrow by not using wingers, the centre of midfield is likely to be congested. As a result, team B may find themselves second to challenges in the middle of the pitch when their midfielders are trying to put the ball wide for wingers given team A’s narrow width.
In this instance, team B may struggle, especially if central midfielders in team A are better ball players. Team B will likely lose possession in central areas, leading to incisive breakaways with the narrow width of team A, possibly leading to team B needing to pull their wingers into a narrow position, which also means players are out of position. This also puts pressure on team B’s defence who are then numerically challenged as team A has four midfielders and two forwards in play against a potentially broken team B’s midfield that has been bypassed and their back four.
Another option is to drop the idea of using wingers and to resort to a flat 4-4-2. However, if team A is simply better man for man, this will just result in team B being played off the park or, in the best case, causing a stalemate draw.
Team B – Central Midfield Overload
A second option available to team B is to utilise a formation that allows large numbers of midfielders. In this instance, team B will deploy 3-4-3. Whilst 3-4-3 does not initially appear to have any more midfielders than team A’s 4-4-2, the flexibility in team B’s attacking three will provide the width that was formerly used in the earlier 4-4-2 variant with wingers.
Due to team B deploying 3-4-3, the midfield 4 will play fairly narrow. In defensive situations, or during early phases of attacks, the outside forwards will act as wingers. With this variation, team B now has up to six players in the middle of the park. Team B’s midfield four is competing like for like in numbers with team A, whilst also having two wingers available to deliver the ball to.
Of course, once play progresses into latter stages of an attacking movement, the players working on the outside of the front three can tuck in to narrower positions to both a) give three players ability to receive the ball in attacking moves, and b) leave team B with a solid defence against team A’s midfield four should an attack break down.
For team B’s 3-4-3 to work, they will need adaptive outside forwards who can play both on the wing as well as in a centre forward/central attacking midfield role. If this was Villa’s team making use of this system, the likes of Charles N’Zogbia and Stephen Ireland would both prove suitable for forward roles, with both having flexibility to play both wide, and in multiple areas.
3-4-3 might also be suitable for Villa because of the fact that we have Cuellar, Clark, and Dunne performing well, and full backs performing badly. To that end, this solves the problem of Cuellar getting game time, it includes the youth of Clark, and also has the experience of Richard Dunne.
An example lineup might be:
Given; Clark, Dunne, Cuellar; Bannan, Petrov, Gardner, Herd; Ireland, Agbonlahor, N’Zogbia
The above is obviously a brief comparison on two tactics against one static opponent so is, by it’s very nature, likely to be limited. No formation will beat any other formation consistently as we all know unless a team has consistently better players than the opposition. This is partly why Manchester United can afford to continue to play 4-4-2, even though the formation is tactically “old”.
As for other formations, the reason we have seen adaption and changes over longer periods of football is that formation and tactics evolve to combat existing tactics, and teams that are better man-for-man. Just as 4-4-2 had been the staple diet of Premier League teams at it’s inception, so 4-5-1 (another 4-3-3 variant) has been adopted to mix up the tactical play. Given enough time, football will, again, adapt to tactics to counteract existing strategy.
Often the reason things change is because creative coaches will start looking at adapting to beat teams. So, to that end, maybe being adaptive isn’t admitting defeat pre-emptively, rather it is staying a step ahead of a manager who believes they know how the opposition will play. If the opposition doesn’t know what you’ll do, then you immediately have the upper hand. Then tactically adapting is actually about being in control.
Maybe, just maybe, Villa will be one of those in the forefront of adapting things given their variable formations this season. Maybe we’re seeing the future coming up, and we just don’t know it.
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